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Abstract —Most of the research in securing Mobile ad 
hoc networks (MANETs) has focused on proposals which 
detect and prevent a specific kind of attack such as sleep 
deprivation, black hole, grey hole and rushing attacks. In 
this paper we broaden our previously develop algorithm 
AIDP and propose a generalized intrusion detection and 
prevention mechanism. We use a combination of anomaly-
based and knowledge-based intrusion detection. This 
approach not only secures the MANET from a wide 
variety of routing attacks but also has the capability to 
detect new unforeseen attacks. Simulation results of a case 
study shows that our proposed mechanism can 
successfully detect attacks, including multiple 
simultaneous different attacks, and identify and isolate the 
intruders causing a variety of attacks, with an affordable 
network overhead.       
Keywords— ad hoc network security; intrusion detection 
& prevention; secure routing   
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 Mobile Ad hoc networks (MANETs) routing 
protocols, such as AODV and DSR, operate on the 
assumption that there is no malicious intruder node in 
the network. Malicious nodes can cause severe 
disruption without violating the routing protocol through 
a wide variety of attacks.  
Intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) provides a 
way to protect nodes against routing attacks. There are 
two ID techniques: knowledge-based intrusion detection 
(KBID) and anomaly-based intrusion detection (ABID).  
KBID has a potentially low false detection rate but it can 
only detect attacks whose signatures are in the database. 
On the other hand ABID not only provides early 
warnings of potential intrusions but also can detect 
attempts to exploit new and unforeseen vulnerabilities; 
however it is more prone to generate false positives than 
KBID. 
In our previous work [1] we proposed Adaptive 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (AIDP), which used 
ABID to detect denial of service (DoS) attacks. In this 
paper we extend AIDP to a Generalised Intrusion 
Detection & Prevention (GIDP) mechanism. We 
propose a combination of anomaly-based and 
knowledge-based ID that takes advantage of both 
techniques. GIDP not only guards MANETs against a 
wide variety of attacks but also has the capability to 
detect new attacks or intrusive activities that degrade 
network performance; to the best of our knowledge this 
is novel.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows.   
Section II describes the related research in securing 
MANETs. Section III reviews typical MANETs routing 
attacks. Section IV presents our proposed mechanism, 
GIDP. Section V illustrates the implementation of our 
proposed mechanism through a case study, including 
simulation. Finally, we summarize our results and future 
work in Section VI. 
II. RELATED RESEARCH 
        Research in securing MANETs has to date mostly 
focused on detecting and preventing specific attacks. 
For example TOGBAD was proposed in [2] to identify 
nodes that attempt to create black hole attacks in 
MANETs that use the OLSR routing protocol. 
Kurosawa and Jamalipour [3] also propose a black hole 
detection mechanism, this time for AODV. Xiaopeng 
and Wei [4] proposed a grey hole attack detection 
scheme for the DSR routing protocol. Ping and Zhang 
[5] considered a route request (RREQ) flooding attack 
in MANETs. They proposed a RREQ flooding 
prevention mechanism based on neighbour’s 
supervision. In [6] Perrig and Johnson analyzed how an 
attacker can launch a rushing attack (RU) in DSR and 
proposed a rushing attack prevention mechanism for 
MANETs.   
      Though most researchers have concentrated on 
protecting MANETs against specific types of attack, 
some have suggested a more general approach. For 
example ARAN [7] is a hop-to-hop authenticated 
routing mechanism that can protect MANETs against a 
number of attacks from external malicious nodes. A 
similar approach, Ariadne [8] has been proposed for 
end-to-end authentication based on shared key pairs. 
We believe more effort is needed on mechanisms which 
can guard MANETs against a wide variety of attacks.         
       Methods proposed in [7] & [8] protect MANETs 
mainly against external attacker through authenticated 
routing.  However an insider trusted node can change 
its behaviour and initiate activities that results in severe 
attacks as we describe below in section III.  
    
III. AODV ROUTING ATTACKS  
         The on-demand routing protocols in MANETs, 
such as AODV and DSR, allow intruders to launch a 
wider variety of attacks. In order to illustrate these 
routing attacks we consider AODV as an example in 
this paper. Using AODV we now give examples of how 
different intrusive activities can cause various attacks in 
MANETs. 
a) Sleep Deprivation through malicious RREQ     
flooding: 
        Sleep deprivation (SD) [9] is a denial of service 
attack in which an attacker interacts with the node in a 
manner that appears to be legitimate; but where the 
purpose of interaction is to keep the victim node out of 
its power conserving sleep mode. An intruder can cause 
SD of a node by exploiting the vulnerability of the route 
discovery process of protocol through malicious route 
request (RREQ) flooding in the following ways: 
Malicious RREQ Flooding 1:  an intruder broadcasts a 
RREQ with a destination IP address that is within the 
network address range but which does not exist. This 
will compel all nodes to forward this RREQ because 
no-one will have the route for this destination IP 
address. 
Malicious RREQ Flooding 2:  after broadcasting a 
RREQ an intruder does not wait for the ring traversal 
time and continues resending the RREQ for same 
destination with higher TTL values. 
b) Black & Grey Hole by false RREP& packet 
dropping: 
        In AODV, the destination sequence number 
(dest_seq) is used to describe the freshness of the route. 
A higher value of dest_seq means a fresher route. On 
receiving a RREQ an intruder can advertise itself as 
having the fresh route by sending a Route Reply 
(RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number larger than 
the current dest_seq number. In this way the intruder 
becomes part of the route to that destination. The 
intruder can then choose to drop all packets, causing a 
black hole (BH) [3] in the network. The severity of the 
attack depends on the number of routes in the network 
the intruder successfully becomes part of; we analyze 
this further in section V.  
      Grey Hole (GH) is a special case of BH attack, in 
which intruder only drops packets selectively, e.g. from 
specific nodes. 
c) Rushing attack through a forged RREQ: 
       In order to limit the control packet overhead an on-
demand protocol only requires nodes to forward the 
first RREQ that arrives for each route discovery.  An 
attacker can exploit this property by spreading RREQ 
packets quickly throughout the network so as to 
suppress any later legitimate RREQ packets. An 
intruder can forward the forged rushed RREQ, giving 
them a higher source sequence (src_seq) number and 
minimum delay. This will suppress the later legitimate 
RREQ and increase the probability that routes that 
include the intruder will be discovered rather than other 
valid routes, causing a rushing attack.  
  
IV. GENERALIZED INTRUSION DETECTION & 
PREVENTION          
A. Assumptions 
      We use ABID to detect intrusion in the network; 
this requires traffic traces that contain only normal 
activities to build a training profile. However, in 
contrast with fixed networks, data resources such as 
[10] that reflect normal activities or events are not 
currently available for MANETs. Therefore we assume 
that the initial behaviour of the network formed on-the-
fly is free from anomalies. We also disregard attacks 
aimed at physical and link layer. Further, we have not 
considered attacks from colluding intruders in this 
paper. To illustrate the implementation of GIDP we 
assume a clustered MANET organization. We select the 
most capable nodes in terms of their processing abilities 
as cluster heads (CHs) and the others nodes becomes 
cluster nodes (CNs). At present we assume secure 
communication between CH and CNs. Most of these 
assumptions will be relaxed in our future work.   
B. GIDP  Architecture & Terminology 
      We now describe our proposed mechanism GIDP. 
GIDP is a hybrid IDP approach that uses a combination 
of anomaly-based and knowledge-based ID. The 
architecture of GIDP is shown in Fig.1. A cluster head 
first gathers data in the form of two matrices: network 
characteristic matrix (NCM) and a derived matrix 
(DM).  The NCM contains data related to the network 
routing protocol; for example in the case study in this 
paper, NCM consists of seven parameters:    
 NCM={RREQ (route request), RREP (route reply), RERR  
        (routeerror), TTL (time to live) values, RREQ src_seq,  
        RREQ dest_seq,  RREP dest_seq}        
 The DM consists of parameters which reflects the 
network performance and can be derived from NCM 
parameters.  For example in the case study in this paper 
DM consists of three parameters: 
 DM= {CPO (control packet overhead), PDR (data packet   
    delivery ratio), CPD (number of control packet dropped)}             
          Then the cluster head employs two phases: training 
and testing. Fig.2 shows the time-based operation of 
GIDP. When the network is established, the CH 
continuously gathers NCM and DM information and 
applies the GIDP training module for N time intervals 
(TI), resulting in initial training profiles (ITPs) of NCM  
 
       Figure 1.  Architecture of GIDP. 
 
and DM. The ITPs reflects the normal behaviour of the 
nodes in the network and the expected network 
performance. In the testing phase the CH applies the 
testing module after each TI. The testing phase consists 
of several tasks as shown in fig.1. Firstly it detects 
intrusion in the network. If there is no intrusion then it 
updates the ITPs in order to adapt the variation in the 
network behaviour as time progresses. If there is 
intrusion, in the second task the CH identifies the attack 
or attacks using existing information in the knowledge 
base.  In the case of known attacks the CH identifies 
intruding nodes using intruder identification rules 
specific to the known attack. To optimise the 
probability of identifying intruders correctly with a low 
level of false positives, it maintains a test sliding 
window (TSW) as shown in fig.2, in which d detections 
of a node are required in p time intervals (TI). If this 
detection threshold is passed then the CH will blacklist 
the node and isolate the node by informing all CNs.  
        If attack identification detects an attack that does 
not match the rules for known attack then CH applies 
the attack inferences. Attack inference stores the rule 
trace of current TI as Detected Rule Trace and looks for 
its match in a TSW. If the match is found in a TSW 
then CH confirms the new attack by constructing & 
adding a rule for the new attack in the set of rules stored 
in knowledge base. 
 
Figure 2.  Time-based operation of GIDP. 
C. Algorithm & Technical Details 
We now explain the training & testing module of GIDP. 
Training: 
       NCM consists of Xi parameters mentioned above, 
where i=1 to 7 and each Xi ={X1, X2, X3,…,XM}is a set 
of random variables from 1 to M, where M is the 
maximum number of random variables of parameter Xi.  
For example NCM [Xi] represent the number of RREQ 
received by all CNs in jth time interval (TI), where M is 
the maximum number of RREQ received in a TI. The 
probability distribution of NCM[Xi] is calculated for the 
TI. CH then calculates the DM parameters CPO (i.e. 
Number of control packet / data packet delivered), PDR 
(i.e. Number of data packet received / data packet 
originated) & CPD (i.e. Number of control packet 
dropped in establishing & maintaining routes in the 
network) for the jth TI, and this whole process is then 
repeated for the N time intervals in the training phase. 
We then calculate mean iX  of P(NCM[X i ]) and means of 
CPO, PDR and CPD for N intervals, which is then 
stored as an ITP (NCM) and ITP (DM) respectively 
containing the expected values for that particular 
network observed for the total time of N*TI seconds. 
 
Testing: 
         In the testing phase GIDP operates in three stages:  
a) intrusion detection, b) attack identification and 
inferences and c) identification and isolation of 
intruding nodes (Fig.1). Now we explain the algorithms 
of stage a, b & c.  For stage a) it employs ABID using 
chi-square goodness of fit test on NCM and then KBID 
using a rule-based approach on both matrices NCM & 
DM is applied in stage b) and c).  
Testing Modules 
This module only takes NCM parameters into account 
and applies chi-square test to identify any intrusion in 
the network. 
 
a)  Intrusion Detection  
.  Do after each TI  
         . collects NCM( X i) from all other CNs in TI, for i 
         . Calculate the probability distribution P (NCM(X i)) 
        .Calculate averages of P(NCM(X i)) & stores as observed values          
     . End do 
    .For i    Performs Hypothesis Testing by first calculating 
       Chi- computed ( 2[i] using eq.1 ) for Xi  
        Ho[i]: Observed distribution of NCM (Xi  ) fits the expected      
           Ha[i]: Observed distribution of NCM (Xi  ) does not fit expected      
         .If (chi-computed[i] (.d.f[i]) > P-value[i] (.d.f[i]))  
              Reject Ho[i].  endif. 
   .End for 
  .Combined Null Hypothesis Testing 
       Combine Ho: Observed distribution of NCM   fits the expected      
           Combine  Ha: Observed distribution of NCM  does not fit expected 
           .If (combined Ho is rejected)  
               Perform Attack identification & inferences Fig.3 (b) 
            else:  Update Expected values  NCM( iX ) ( i.e. ITP(NCM)) 
  .Exit 
     Figure 3a.   Pseudocode of intrusion detection module. 
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This module continuously monitors the network. In 
each TI the CH first performs hypothesis testing for 
each parameter Xi of NCM at calculated chi-computed 
values obtain from eq.1, where Xi is the parameter of 
NCM and k(1 to M) is the number of random variable 
in each parameter Xi. The CH then performs combine 
hypothesis testing of NCM as shown in fig 3a. If the 
combined Ho is rejected then it assumes intrusion in the 
TI. Else we update the ITP (NCM) using an 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) :   
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1, , ,(1 ) (2)( ) ( ) ( )( )..
M M M
q k q k q k
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where ( )1,( )
M
q k
iXN C M  and 
( )1,( )
M
q k
iXN C M  represents 
the expected and observed value for update period 
number(q) respectively. The value of q is incremented 
in the TI when no intrusion in the MANET is detected. 
k represents the random variable from 1 to M in each Xi 
and =2/(q-1) is the weighting factor. As q increases 
the weighting for older data points decreases 
exponentially giving more importance to the current 
observation. 
b) Attack identification and inferences 
.Reads set of rules Fig.3b (1)  
       .Set up the Interpreter for Rule-based approach  
      .Interpreter applies Forward-Chaining on set of rules Fig.3b (1) 
          .If (Any Goal Condition of known attacks are fulfilled)  
               Apply rules for IntruderIdentification & Isolation Fig.3c   
         .endif. 
        .If (Goal Condition==” POTENTIALUNKNOWNATTACK”)  
             Interpreter applies Attack Inferences Fig.3b (2),     
        .endif. 
    . Exit. 
Figure 3b.  Pseudocode of Attack Identification & Inferences module. 
 Set of Rules example 
Rule.1 x (chi-squaretest(NCM[x]))-> (CheckDerivedMatrix=TRUE) 
Rule.2 CheckDerivedMatrix  y (Test(DM[y]))->      
              (PotentialAttack=TRUE) 
Rule.3  PotentialAttack  ->(BestRule=TRUE) 
              Best Rules for some known attacks: 
Rule.4  BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREQ]))   
              Test(DM[CPO]) ->  “SLEEP DEPRIVATION” 
Rule.5  BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREPdest_seq]))   
              (Test(DM[PDR]) V Lowest(PDR) )  -> “BLACKHOLE”  
Rule.6 BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREPdest_seq]))   
              (Test(DM[PDR])  -> “GREYHOLE”  
Rule.7 BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREQsrc_seq]))   
              (Test(DM[CPD])  -> “RUSHING”              
Rule.8  ¬(x (chi-square-test(NCM[x])))  ¬(y( Test(DM[y]))) -->  
              “POTENTIALFALSEALARM”  
 Rule.9  (Rule.1   Rule.2   ¬BestRule)  -> 
              ” POTENTIALUNKOWNATTACK” 
     Figure 3b (1).   Set of Rules example in knowledge base. 
 
 Attack Inferences  
  . If (Detected Rule Trace is Empty) 
      Store Detected Rule Trace = Rule Trace 
    Else If (Rule Trace == Detected Rule Trace) 
               New attack Rule Trace= Rule Trace 
               Construct a rule for New attack Rule Trace 
              Append New attack Rule Trace in set of rule trace  
              Set Detected Rule Trace =Empty . endif 
  .endif 
Figure 3b (2).  Pseudocode of Attack Inferences 
          In case of intrusion the CH calls the Attack 
Identification and Inferences module (Fig.3b). This 
module obtains a set of rules from knowledge base, an 
example set being presented in fig.3b(1). We have 
constructed these rules from our previous work [1] (i.e. 
AIDP simulation results), analyzing various attacks & 
their    impact    on    network    performance     through  
c) Intruder Identification &Isolation 
a) Identifying intruding nodes 
          . Obtain known attack Rules for intruder Identification  
           . for all Goal condition fulfilled   
        Apply intruder identification rule for each detected known attack 
               add each detected node Vi  to List of Nodes Detected (LND) 
          . endfor 
b) Response Mechanism 
         For all nodes Vi  in LND 
                 . If ( Vi  detections in Potential Intruder List( PIL) > 
                                                  Detections_required_To_ Accuse (d) ) 
                CH: Blacklist Vi & Broadcast Accusation Packet (AP)        
        else :     enter Vi  in PIL     .endif 
   .End for 
c) Accusation Packet (AP) Handling 
       . Each CN Vi maintain its local BlacklistTable (BLT) 
          .if CN Vi receives an AP for CN Vj 
             .If CN Vi has node Vj   in its BLT  then   Ignore AP 
               else:     CN adds node Vj   to its   BLT & rebroadcast AP  
            .endif 
         .endif    
d) Isolating Intruding Nodes 
         .if node Vi receives packet from node Vj 
                 .If node Vj is in node Vi   BLT  
            Ignore packet & drop all packets queued from Vj 
             Else:    handle & process packet    .endif 
         .endif
 Figure 3c Pseudocode of Intruder Identification & Isolation modules. 
 
simulations and analysis of existing literature of known 
attacks for example [3, 4 & 6]. In fig.3b(1) chi-square 
test(NCM[x]) predicate returns true if the parameter x is 
anomalous in NCM. Similarly predicate or 
propositional function Test (DM[y]) returns true if the 
test on parameter y of DM fails. This test uses a tool of 
Statistical Process Control known as variable control 
chart based on standard deviation . In the Attack 
Identification & Inference module a ruled base 
approach is used in which an interpreter can either 
employ forward or backward chaining system. A 
forward chaining system process rules one by one by 
checking premise (condition in the rule) to reach 
conclusions, it can also draw new conclusions. On the 
other hand backward chaining is goal driven, that is it 
reaches the conclusion first and keeps looking for rules 
that would allow the conclusion.  In GIDP an 
interpreter applies forward chaining on Set of rules 
fig.3b (1), at the end look for the Goal Condition 
fulfilled as described in fig.3b.  
          In case of any known attack detected in the TI, 
the interpreter applies the Intruder Identification & 
Isolation module (fig.3c) to identify and isolate the 
intruding nodes. This module first identifies the 
intruding nodes by applying known attack rules for 
intruder identification. For example in case of SD 
attack it employs control chart (explained above) based 
on  of RREQ generated by all nodes and adds detected 
node Vi in the LND. Response mechanism (fig.3c(b)) 
then checks if detection threshold d is reached for any 
node Vi in the LND in p TI then it Blacklist the node Vi 
and inform all other CNs through sending an AP. When 
a CN receives an AP it first checks the broadcast id & 
source address to avoid processing a duplicate AP. If 
the accused node is already blacklisted the CN will 
ignore & drop the AP to prevent unnecessary network 
traffic. Otherwise, the CN will blacklist the accused 
node and rebroadcast the AP.  Finally, to isolate the 
intruder form the network all nodes will not only drop 
the packets from a blacklisted node but also 
immediately ignore all packets in their queue from the 
blacklisted nodes as shown in Fig.3c(d).    
       If Goal Condition with POTENTIALUNKNOWNATTACK 
is fulfilled during attack identification process then 
interpreter save this Rule Trace and looks for the match 
of this Rule Trace in current TSW. If match is found 
then it confirm new attack detection by constructing a 
new rule and appending the new rule in a Set of Rule 
stored in knowledge base (fig.3b(2)). 
V. CASE STUDY AND EVALUATION 
         To assess the applicability and performance of 
GIDP, we considered a case study with different attack 
scenarios.  We present the simulation results of these 
scenarios and some key findings from the analysis of 
attacks. We used GloMoSim to build the simulation 
environment and then evaluate GIDP using simulation 
& GIDP parameters shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE I. Simulation & GIDP Parameters 
Simulation Parameters 
Number of nodes 25 50 
Terrain dimensions 500*500 metres 707.10*707.10 metres 
Node placement Uniform distribution 
Simulation Traffic CBR (Constant Bit Rate) 
Simulation time 2500 seconds 
Routing protocol AODV 
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11 
Mobility Random Way Point Model (RWP) 
  GIDP Parameters 
Time interval TI 100 seconds 
 Training, Testing TI  Training=5 TIs, Testing= 20 TIs 
Number of parameters  NCM =7 & DM=3 parameters 
Chi-square test  () 5% (i.e. 95% confidence interval) 
Test Sliding Window(TSW)  5 TIs 
Detections-Required 
To_Accuse (d) 
2 in a TSW 
Number of intruders 1or 2 or 3 or 4             
A.  Scenario 1 
     In the first scenario we test GIDP with a denial of 
service attack (sleep deprivation) through malicious 
RREQ flooding (MRF), as described in section III-a. 
The intruders launch MRF1 or MRF2 attacks. At each 
tested mean speed and for each network size (25 or 50 
nodes) we performed 40 runs with no intrusion and 40 
runs with intruders using a mix of both MRF1 and 
MRF 2. 
        The graph on the left in Fig. 4 depicts the success 
rate  ( SR )  and  false  alarm ( FA )  rate  of  GIDP as  a 
function  of  the  nodes’  mean  speed in  25  &  50 node 
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Fig. 4 Success rate, false alarm rate and control packet overhead as a 
function of nodes mean speed (m/s). 
networks with SD attack. By SR here we mean the rate 
of correctly detecting intrusion in the network, 
identifying the attack type and then identifying & 
isolating the node which is causing the attack. A false 
alarm (FA) means that a correctly behaving node has 
been incorrectly identified and isolated. The graph 
shows good performance of GIDP in terms high SR and 
low FA rates against SD attack. The graph on the right 
in Fig.4 shows the control packet overhead in a 25 node 
network when there is a) no attack in the network, b) a 
sleep deprivation attack with no protection and c) a 
sleep deprivation attack with GIDP in place.  The graph 
shows that GIDP reduces the control packet overhead 
and increases network performance when it is used in a 
network under sleep deprivation attack.    
B. Scenario 2 
      In the second scenario we test GIDP with a mix of 
black and grey hole attacks caused by initiating a false 
RREP and then dropping packets as described in 
section III-b. In order to launch these attacks, on 
receiving a RREQ an intruder generates a false RREP 
packet with dest_seq=current dest_seq+f. Through 
simulations we observed that the value of f should be at 
least 5 in a 25 node network, and higher for larger 
networks, because some properly behaving nodes have 
routes fresher than the intruding node for the 
destination node. We also note that the severity of the 
attacks depends on the number of paths in the network 
that the intruder manages to capture. One false RREP 
packet only allows an intruder to capture the route of 
one node in the network, because RREP packets are 
unicast.  
        A single simulation consists of 20 test TIs. We 
monitor the number of false RREP packets (e) 
generated by an intruding node in a simulation and its 
impact on packet delivery ratio. Fig.5 shows that 
increasing the value of e reduces the packet delivery 
ratio during the BH attack and therefore increases the 
severity of the attack. 
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Fig.5 PDR vs Number of false RREP by an intruder(e) in a simulation. 
        The graph on the left in Fig.6 depicts the SR and 
FA of GIDP with black & grey hole attack with 8 e 
<20 and 5 f  30. The graph on the right in Fig.6 
shows the packet delivery ratio with no attack, black & 
grey hole attack with no protection and black & grey 
hole attacks with GIDP in place. It shows that GIDP 
can successfully detect these attacks, and identify & 
isolate the intruding node and by doing so GIDP also 
improves the network performance in terms of packet 
delivery ratio. 
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 Fig. 6 Success rate, false alarm rate and packet delivery ratio as a 
function of nodes mean speed (m/s). 
C. Scenario 3 
       In this scenario we tested GIDP with the rushing 
attack through forged RREQ as explained in section III-
c. We note that intruders trying to cause rushing attack 
by sending a forged RREQ with a higher src_seq and 
minimum delay increase the number of control packets 
(i.e. RREQ+RREP+RERR) dropped in the network. 
Fig.7 shows that GIDP can detect rushing attacks and 
after isolating the intruder reduces the number of 
control packet dropped. 
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Fig. 7 Success rate, false alarm rate and control packet dropped as a 
function of nodes mean speed (m/s). 
D. Scenario 4 
      In the last scenario we assess GIDP with a 
combination of simultaneous attacks (section III) 
launched by separate intruders in a simulation. We 
perform 20 runs with each combination of attacks. SR 
here means that GIDP has detected, identified and 
isolated all the intruders causing attacks. FA means 
GIDP has detected and isolated a properly behaving 
node as an intruder. Fig.8 depicts the success rate and 
false alarm rate of GIDP with the various combinations 
of attacks simulated. The graph shows generality of our 
proposed mechanism. During the experiments GIDP 
has flagged a POTENTIALUNKNOWNATTACK on a 
few occasions but they did not meet the criteria of 
GIDP attack inferences (i.e. d detections of same rule 
trace in a TSW) (fig3b.(2)) to mark them as a new 
attack.  
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Fig. 8 GIDP success & false alarm rates with combinations of attacks. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
        Many proposals have been made in the literature to 
detect various attacks, but most are attack-specific. 
Unlike some mechanisms that provide protection 
through authenticated routing, in this paper we have 
proposed a Generalized Intrusion Detection & 
Prevention mechanism which monitors both network 
layer characteristics (NCM) and performance statistics 
(DM).  GIDP uses a combination of anomaly-based and 
knowledge-based ID that can protect MANETs against 
a variety of attacks from both external and internal 
intruders and also has the capability of detecting new 
unforeseen vulnerabilities. Simulation results show our 
proposed mechanism can secure MANETs from a wide 
variety of attacks with an affordable processing 
overhead. In our ongoing work we are focusing on 
implementation issues of GIDP and so that it can 
operate & adapt to networks with different security 
requirements.  
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